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Bankruptcy-Reorganization Court has Jurisdiction Over Debtor
Corporation's Bonds Held by Non-resident-Debtor corporation,
seeking reorganization under Chapter X 1 of the Bankruptcy Act in the
District Court for New Jersey, therein sought an injunction to restrain the
transfer of debtor's bonds held by a New York bank, ostensibly for a
Swiss owner. Debtor alleged that the bonds were in fact owned by an
Italian corporation against which it claimed a set-off. Without deciding
the objection that it lacked jurisdiction over either the New York bank,
Swiss owner, Italian corporation, or the bonds, the reorganization court
denied the injunction on the merits. On review, held that the court had
jurisdiction and reversed on the merits. In re International Power
Securities Corp., 170 F. 2d 399 (3d Cir. 1948).
Like bankruptcy courts, reorganization courts have summary juris-
diction to protect and administer debtor's estates and determine all claims
upon them.2 In addition they have exclusive jurisdiction over the debtor
and his property, "wherever located." 3 Thus the reorganization court
may issue injunctions to preserve and protect debtor's property situated
anywhere in the United States 4 as well as stay orders to prohibit com-
mencement or continuance of suits against the debtor. 5 What constitutes
debtor's property coming within the court's exclusive jurisdiction is not
definitively expressed. It is generally held to include that property which
is in the debtor's actual possession or held by others whose claims to it
are not adverse, 6 or, if adverse, are less than colorable.7  For example,
because of debtor's equity' of redemption, the court may exercise con-
trol over collateral held by secured creditors 8 or summarily take posses-
sion of property held by a mortgagee. 9 Similarly a chose in action be-
longing to the debtor is property which the court may summarily protect
from interference.' A plenary suit, however, is required to enforce the
chose." So also, a plenary suit by the reorganization trustee is required
to take property in the possession of claimants whose claims are substan-
1. 52 STAT. 883 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §§ 501 et seq. (1946).
2. 52 STAT. 883, 884 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §§ 502, 512, 514 (1946). See Continental
Illinois Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 294 U. S. 648 (1935) ; In re
Cuyahoga Finance Co., 136 F. 2d 18 (6th Cir. 1943) ; In re Burton Coal Co., 126 F. 2d
447 (7th Cir. 1942). See Ex parte Baldwin, 291 U. S. 610 (1934).
3. 52 STAT. 884 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 511 (1946). Isaac v. Hobbs Tie & Lumber
Co., 282 U. S. 734 (1931) ; see Ex parte Baldwin, 291 U. S. 610 (1934).
4. Cases cited note 2 supra.
5. 52 STAT. 884, 885 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §§ 513, 516(4) (1946).
6. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U. S. 478 (1940); Continental
Illinois Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 294 U. S. 648 (1935); In re
United States Realty & Improvement Co., 153 F. 2d 853 (2d Cir. 1946); In re
Moulding-Brownell Corp., 101 F. 2d 664 (7th Cir. 1939).
7. The reorganization court has jurisdiction to investigate and determine whether
adverse claims are substantial. Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U. S. 426
(1924) ; In re Mt. Forrest Fur Farms of America, Inc., 122 F. 2d 232 (6th Cir. 1941).
8. Continental Illinois Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 294 U. S.
648 (1935) ; In re United States Realty & Improvement Co., 153 F. 2d 853 (2d Cir.
1946).
9. 52 STAT. 902 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 657 (1946).




tial. 12 Extraterritorial jurisdiction thus limited to debtor's property may
be extended only by consent of the litigants.' 3 Inasmuch as neither the
bonds nor respondents were within the court's territorial jurisdiction, and
the latter had not submitted claims or otherwise consented to its juris-
diction, it is difficult to determine the basis of the court's action.' 4
Seemingly the decision could be sustained only on one of two
theories, neither of which was explicitly adopted by the court. By analogy
to cases arising in garnishment proceedings, the court may have con-
sidered debts owed by the debtor corporation as "property" within its
jurisdiction.', However, if the bonds were negotiable, there is authority
for the view that the obligation to pay was not subject to process against
the debtor and should not be considered property within the jurisdiction.' 6
The second theory would treat the right of set-off as an equity of the
debtor in the bonds, if owned by the Italian corporation, sufficient to
constitute property of the debtor over which the court would have juris-
diction. Such an approach, however, would disregard the fact that set-
off is merely a cancellation of mutual claims based upon convenience
of judicial administration.' 7  In effect, therefore, the court appears to
have decided that it has power to prevent a change in title to specific
assets located in a foreign jurisdiction if those assets constitute a con-
venient fund out of which a claim of the corporation-in-reorganization
against one of its creditors can be satisfied. This seems beyond any
authority conferred by the statute or by precedent.' s
Carriers-Demurrage Charges Cannot be Waived by Consignee-
Plaintiff sued to recover demurrage charges I paid to defendant railroad
for the constructive placement on defendant's tracks of cars consigned to
plaintiff. The cars could not be delivered because of the congested con-
dition of plaintiff's private tracks. According to the governing freight
tariffs, which are schedules of both rates and duties, written notice of
such placement was required. Instead, pursuant to an oral agreement,
plaintiff was given adequate notice by telephone. Defendant contended
that the plaintiff had thus waived the requirement of written notice. The
circuit court, however, affirmed the decision for the plaintiff, holding that
12. Warder v. Brady, 115 F. 2d 89 (4th Cir. 1940).
13. See 6 COLLIER, BAxKRuPTcY 597 (14th ed., Moore & Oglebay, 1947).
14. Besides basing the holding on the "facts of the case," the court relied on the
broad language of cases in which there were clear bases of jurisdiction. In re Cuya-
hoga Finance Co., 136 F. 2d 18 (6th Cir. 1943) (collateral) ; In re Burton Coal Co.,
126 F. 2d 447 (7th Cir. 1942) (collateral).
15. Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215 (1904) (Situs of a debt is wherever debtor can
be found).
16. REsTATEuENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 52 (1930). There is, however, no uni-
formity on this point due to differences in the terminology of the various state statutes.
See Briant v. Reed, 14 N. J. Eq. 271, 274 (Ch. 1846) (terms of early attachment stat-
ute, identical with terms of present statute, permit attachment of obligor of a nego-
tiable instrument). N. J. STAT. 2:42-103 (Supp. 1948).
17. See 30 STAT. 565 (1898), as amended, 11 U. S. C. § 108a (1946).
18. The motivating fear that the bonds might be transferred to persons against
whom debtor had no claim does not seem well founded inasmuch as the necessary relief
was readily available in New York, the situs of the bonds and domicile of respondents.
1. Demurrage is the charge for the unreasonable delay or detention of railroad
cars.
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the requirement of written notice was part of the tariff, and "the tariff
cannot be waived." Empire Box Corp. v. Delaware L. & W. Ry., 171
F. 2d 389 (2d Cir. 1948).
Under the Interstate Commerce Act, common carriers must file and
publish the rates and charges for the transportation of goods and for any
service rendered in connection therewith.2  In order to prevent the pos-
sibility of discrimination, the law forbids such carriers from deviating
from the tariffs in effect. 3 Thus, for example, a carrier may not bind
itself by contract to a greater obligation than is permitted under the
tariff,4 nor is it even estopped from asserting its rights to rates or charges
filed with the Commission although it has failed to post the tariffs as
required,6 or has misquoted the tariff to the shipper who has relied on
the misquotations." Similarly, there has arisen the principle that a
tariff may not be waived. In Davis v. Henderson,7 the Supreme Court
denied recovery to a shipper for a carrier's breach of duty to provide
cars which the shipper had ordered orally, because written notice was
required by the applicable tariff, which could not be waived. The court,
in the instant case prohibited a consignee, rather than a carrier, from
waiving the tariff requirement of written notice, although oral notice
had been agreed upon by the parties. The court reasoned that the Davis
case was controlling and that the administrative efficiency gained through
rigid adherence to the rule offset occasional injustice to the individual
carriers.8 However, as the court noted, the Davis case and the instant
case are readily distinguishable. The opportunities presented for dis-
crimination by the railroads under the present case are obvious; a car-
rier by the mere failure to provide written notice can relieve a consignee
from the payment of demurrage charges." The rule, as originally enun-
ciated, was designed to prevent such discrimination.' 0 Moreover, since
the Act only defines the duty of carriers not to deviate from its terms, it
provides little authority for this extension of the rule." Carriers are
forbidden to remit charges in any manner, even though done uninten-
tionally.12 The Act does not state that shippers and consignees must accept
all services offered in a tariff. Some kind of notice is necessary in order to
charge them for demurrage, since demurrage is in the nature of a
penalty for delay. The requirement that it be written, however, is for
the benefit of shippers and the Commission, since it offers easy proof
that notice was given. Where notice has been given, though the formal
requirements have not been met, the purpose of the Act would seem to
require a holding that a return of charges, even though mistaken, be pro-
2. 24 STAT. 381 (1887), as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 6(1) (1946).
3. See, e. g., Lowden v. Simonds-Shields-Lonsdale Grain Corp., 306 U. S. 516,
520 (1939).
4. Davis v. Cornwell, 264 U. S. 560 (1923).
5. Kansas City S. Ry. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639 (1913).
6. Pettibone v. Richardson, 126 F. 2d 969 (7th Cir. 1942).
7. 266 U. S. 92 (1924).
8. Instant case at 391. The court also gave weight to the fact that the Commis-
3ion had previously interpreted Davis v. Henderson as the court has here.
9. See Campbell Construction Co. v. La Crosse & S. E. Ry., 95 I. C. C. 603, 606
(1919).
10. Georgia, F. & A. Ry. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U. S. 190, 195 (1919).
11. See note 2 supra.
12. Central Warehouse Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 20 F. 2d 828, 829 (8th
Cir. 1927).
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hibited as analogous to a rebate. Certainly the shipper has no cause to
complain, and should be able to waive formal formal requirements. The
public interest in speed and efficiency cannot justifiably be said to precede
the public interest in preventing discrimination. It would appear that the
decision in the instant case was based on little more than the words of the
rule, which was adopted in a different situation to serve a different end.
Carriers-Motor Contract Carriers not Permitted to "Tack"
Operating Rights in Order to Render Through Service-American
Trucking Associations petitioned the Interstate Commerce Commission
for a clarification of its rulings concerning the legality of "tacking" 1
operating permits. The Association recited two apparently inconsistent
rules voiced in ICC decisions. First, a contract carrier acquiring the
rights to operate over two separate but connected routes is prohibited
from conducting a through service over their combined lengths with-
out specific authority from the Commission.2 Second, a contract car-
rier with a right to operate over one route may, as agent for the shipper
at the end of the run, transfer the goods to a connecting carrier for trans-
portation over a second route.8  The petitioner pointed out that this
second ruling in effect permits through service over the connecting routes,
and that the first ruling, in prohibiting such service after the two car-
riers have merged, is an unwarranted restriction of the scope of the two
operating rights. The Commission nevertheless endorsed both rulings,
explaining that, while the equivalent of through service is possible over
the routes of connecting carriers, technically none exists, since such serv-
ice by definition is the carriage of freight over two connected routes
without the intervention of the shipper at the connecting point, and
there is such intervention when a carrier acts as the shipper's agent. It
concluded that through service does not exist in either situation, and
can be permitted only after express finding that it is consistent with the
public interest and the national transportation policy.4 Service of Con-
tract Carriers, ICC No. MC-C-1009, January 10, 1949.
Federal regulation of motor carriers was found necessary primarily in
order to protect the railroads from competition they could not meet,5
and to save reliable truckers from the price slashing of the irregular,
uninsured "tramp carriers." 6 Free enterprise had failed to maintain
healthy conditions in the transportation industry. The Motor Carrier Act
of 1935 7 accordingly restricted the entrance into the field of new compet-
itors, and gave the ICC substantial authority over the existing car-
1. The.practice, allowed common carriers, of carrying freight over the full length
of two separately granted but connecting operating permits.
2. Longshore Extension, 43 M. C. C. 755 (1944) ; Marshall-Purchase-Cunning-
ham, 36 M. C. C. 507 (1941).
3. Barton-Robinson Convoy Co., Extension, 19 M. C. C. 629, 634 (1939) ; Holmes
Contract Carrier Application, 8 M. C. C. 391 (1938).
4. For the national transportation policy, see 54 STAT. 899 (1940), 49 U. S. C.
§301 notes (1946).
5. REP. FEDERAL COOR)INATOR OF TRANsPoRTATIoN, H. R. Doc. No. 89, 74th
Cong., Ist Sess. 3, 5 (1935); GEORGE, MOTOR CARRIER REGULATION IN THE UNITED
STATEs 174 (1929).
6. For state recognition of this problem, see GEORGE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 254.
7. 49 STAT. 543 (1935), as amended, 49 U. S. C. §§301-327 (1946).
1949]
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riers. The act distinguished between common carriers, which stand
ready to furnish anyone with transportation, and contract carriers which
pick their own customers and give them specialized service.8 The Com-
mission has interpreted the measure as meaning that contract carriers
are to be regulated primarily to protect common carriers, whose service is
more important to the nation.9 With this purpose in mind, one of the
many precautions taken by the ICC is to forbid a contract carrier from
furnishing transportation beyond the limits specified in its permit.10 As
stated above, however, the practice of transferring freight to connecting
carriers has been permitted, perhaps because the resulting through serv-
ice has not been large enough to harm a corresponding common carrier
service, or perhaps because its prohibition would be such a serious re-
striction of the shipper's right to contract with whom he pleases.
Since through service may in effect be provided by two carriers be-
fore merger, permission of the practice after merger could create no new
competition for common carriers. On the other hand, its prohibition
eliminates the service previously available to the shipper, and curtails
the scope of the two permits held by the surviving carrier. In opposition
to these considerations, the Commission has been content merely to raise
the technical argument that the surviving carrier may render only those
services which are specifically described in its permits, and to add, with-
out explanation, that the "basic concepts" governing the issuance of per-
mits "are entirely inconsistent" with such a practice.'i This failure to
support its decisions with sound economic reasons has reduced the Com-
mission's statement to a mere clarification of its inconsistency.
Contempt-Lawyer's Persistence in Arguing Judicial Ruling
Held to be Contempt-While participating as counsel in the trial of
a case, the petitioner in his address to the jury commented upon evidence
which had previously been ruled inadmissible.' The statement was
stricken on objection and his attempts to rephrase led to an argument
on the ruling. The judge threatened a mistrial and fine if the petitioner
"messed" with him any longer. When counsel took exception to the
court's conduct, he was adjudged guilty of contempt. Each subsequent
remark made by the petitioner met with an increase in the fine, imprison-
ment, and culminated in an order to eject him bodily from the court room.
The Texas Supreme Court denied an application for a writ of habeas
corpus,2 which ruling was subsequently affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court with four justices dissenting. Fisher v. Pace, 69 Sup.
Ct. 425 (1949).
The historic, inherent power of courts to summarily punish con-
tempt committed in their presence without apparent regard for normal
procedures of due process is well settled.3 The impelling force to pre-
8. 49 STAT. 544 (1935), as amended, 49 U. S. C. §303 (1946).
9. Contracts of Contract Carriers, 1 M. C. C. 628 (1937).
10. Holmes Contract Carrier Applications, sipra note 2, at 391.
11. Instant case at sheet 6.
1. The court had noted an exception to the ruling excluding the evidence.
2. Ex parte Fisher, 146 Tex. 328, 206 S. W. 2d 1000 (1947).
3. In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 274-275 (1947) ; Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S.
517, 534-536 (1925) ; Ex Parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289, 302-303, 313-314 (1888).
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serve orderly administration of the law and the dignity of the court neces-
sitates this extraordinary grant of authority.4  Experience has proved
that conduct which substantially interferes with the order and decorum
of the court-room is an obstacle to due process and as such is punishable
as contempt. A lawyer's freedom of speech is necessarily curtailed by
the legal and social duty he owes to the court, and even remote and
inferential violations have been punished by the invocation of this power. 6
Since this summary procedure is an exception to the principle that trial
by jury is essential to democratic ideas of due process, 7 its limits should
be clearly and narrowly confined to conduct which is such an open aid
flagrant defiance of the court that it threatens demoralization of the court's
authority." Unfortunately the decision in the instant case fails to articu-
late any definitive limitations on the use of this power. While the majority
intimated that the record manifested contemptuous conduct, they pTace
great reliance on the decision of the state court. The dissent, on the other
hand, admitted the necessity for the power but would restrict its use to
cases of "actual" obstruction, free from all indications of petty disagree-
ments and fits of temper on the part of the judge. In holding that the
judge's language was only "mildly" provocative and that petitioner's
freedom of speech was not infringed upon, the decision suggests the ex-
tent to which the United States Supreme Court will go to preserve judicial
dignity.
Judicial power, like all other powers is of an encroaching nature and
in the hands of truculent judges it can readily become an instrument of
abuse against practitioners.9 While the instant decision may well be the
correct one on the facts, it is questionable whether the dignity of the
court is so vastly more important than the right of resourceful lawyers to
adequately represent their clients. Since the trial judge apparently did
display a lack of good judgment and lack of judicial serenity, this decision
may open the door to judicial despotism in trial courts. The power to
summarily punish contempt should be modified to avoid forcing lawyers
to a course of apology and submission. In addition, its limits should be
defined so that appellate courts cannot affirm the use of the power merely
by asserting the necessity for- its existence.
Duress-A Defense as a Matter of Law Only When Alleged Facts
are Uncontradicted-Defendant, who had been ordered deported,
engaged plaintiff attorney to represent him before the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals. Plaintiff was a former chairman of the Board and special-
ized in immigration and deportation cases; defendant was an Italian sea-
4. Ex parte Terry, supra note 3, at 313. See Deutsch, Liberty of Expression and
Contempt of Court, 27 MiNN. L. REv. 296 (1942). For other authorities see the
opinions of the instant case.
5. See note 3 supra.
6. See, e. g., Rogers v. Green, 9 Colo. 506, 13 Pac. 514 (1887) ; cf. Chicago Bar
Ass'n v. Metzen, 291 Ill. 55, 125 N. E. 734 (1919) ; State v. Breckenridge, 126 Okla.
86, 259 Pac. 744 (1927) ; Body, The Duty of the Lawyer to the Court, 11 Iowa L.
REv. 224 (1926). But cf. Ex parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa. 220 (1880).
7. See Nelles, The Summary Power to Punish for Contempt, 31 CoL. L. Rnv. 956
(1931).
8. See Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517, 536 (1925).
9. See Doyle, Free Speech and Fair Trials, 22 NEB. L. REv. 1 (1943); Radin,
Freedom of Speech and Contempt of Court, 36 Irm. L. REv. 599 (1942). See the dis-
senting opinion in the instant case; Ex parte Fisher, supra note 2, at 336, 206 S. W. 2d
at 1005 (dissenting opinion).
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man who had difficulty with the English language. A motion to reopen
the deportation proceedings was successful and a further hearing on the
moral character of the defendant was ordered. Defendant contended no
fee was due until a final order had been entered, but at plaintiff's in-
sistence he signed a note for the amount thereof. In a suit on the unpaid
note, defendant pleaded duress, alleging that plaintiff had orally and by
letter threatened to bring suit for his fee unless the note were given, stat-
ing that he was certain deportation would follow the filing of the suit.'
Defendant's motion for directed verdict was overruled, and the case was
submitted to the jury. On appeal, verdict for plaintiff was affirmed; the
court refused to declare as a matter of law that defendant signed the note
under duress. Rizzi v. Fannelli, 63 A. 2d 872 (D. C. 1949).
When duress is pleaded as a defense to liability on a contract, the
courts reserve to themselves the determination whether the facts offered
as proof, if uncontradicted, are sufficient to make out a case of duress.
2
If the facts are disputed, it becomes a question for the jury to determine
whether duress existed in the particular transaction.8  The yardstick, by
which the courts measure the sufficiency of the evidence to constitute
duress as a matter of law, is necessarily couched in general terms and
is therefore difficult to delimit. It is clear that the transaction must have
been entered into under the influence of fear strong enough to override
the use of free will and judgment.4  In modern times this test has be-
come more and more subjective, i. e., did the threats in fact overcome
the will of the person threatened? r In addition, the act or threat which
induces the fear must be wrongful. 6 Thus, to threaten to bring suit on a
good cause of action,1 or one believed to be good,8 is not duress, but to
threaten to bring suit on a claim known to be uncollectible is duress.9
In light of the foregoing tests, it is not surprising to find that most cases
of duress are determined by the jury.
In the instant case the court indicated defendant alleged facts which,
if uncontradicted, were sufficient to constitute duress. 10 Plaintiff, in re-
buttal thereof, testified, inter alia, that he had told defendant that he,
himself, would do nothing to have him deported." However, plaintiff
offered no evidence to explain his statement that deportation would re-
1. Instant case at 873 n. 1 (excerpt from letter sent defendant by plaintiff) "...
You force me to sue you in court. That I am going to do. As soon as I do, your
deportation will follow-of this I am certain ..
2. Herald v. Hardin, 95 Fla. 889, 116 So. 863 (1928) ; American Nat. Bank of
Lake Crystal v. Helling, 161 Minn. 504, 202 N. W. 20 (1935).
3. McKenzie-Hague Co. v. Carbide and Carbon Chemical Corp., 73 F. 2d 78
(8th Cir. 1934) ; 5 Wn.LismON, CoN RACTs § 1603 (Rev. ed. 1937).
4. Towson v. Moore, 173 U. S. 17 (1899) ; Shelley v. Board of Trade, 87 Cal.
App. 344, 262 Pac. 403 (1st Div. 1927) ; RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 492 (1932).
5. Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Begley, 310 Mo. 287, 275 S. W. 540 (1925);
5 WmmIsOTor, CONTRAcTS § 1605 (Rev. ed. 1937); RESTATEMENT, CoNmAxcrs § 493
(1932).
6. Connolly v. Bouck, 174 Fed. 312 (8th Cir. 1909) ; Miller v. Davis' Estate, 2
Colo. 485, 122 Pac. 793 (1912) ; RESTATEMENT, CoNmTAcrs §492 (1932).
7. McKenzie-Hague Co. v. Carbide and Carbon Chemical Corp., supra note 3;
Dick v. Marx & Rowalle, Inc., 4 F. 2d 879 (D. C. Cir. 1925).
8. Remington Arms Co. v. Feeny Tool Co., 97 Conn. 129, 115 Atl. 629 (1921);
Mills v. Forest Preserve Distlict, 345 Ill. 503, 178 N. E. 426 (1931).
9. Wake Development Co. v. O'Leary, 118 Cal. App. 131, 4 P. 2d 802 (2d Div.
1931) ; Foote v. De Poy, 126 Iowa 366, 102 N. W. 112 (1905).
10. Instant case at 872.
11. Id. at 874.
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suit from the mere filing of the contract claim. It must be remembered,
that the pending hearing in defendant's deportation case had to do with
his moral character.' 2  The failure to pay debts and consequent liability
to civil suit is not evidence of moral turpitude under the immigration
laws.' 3 If the plaintiff intended to take no behind-the-scenes action in
the deportation proceedings, the only inference to be drawn from his
statement was that it was a legal opinion, known by him to be erroneous
because of his skill in deportation law, and communicated to induce un-
willed action from his client. Furthermore, the presumption of overreach-
ing or duress in contracts regarding compensation between attorney and
client after that fiduciary relationship has once been established,
14 evi-
dences the law's recognition of the client's particular vulnerability and a
desire to hold attorneys to a high standard of conduct. Thus analyzed,
defendant's evidence of duress was unrebutted, and the court could well
have directed a verdict in his favor.
Evidence-Comment Upon Refusal to Waive Dead Man's Statute
is not Grounds for Reversal-In an action against a decedent's estate
plaintiff's attorney commented to the jury on the defendant's refusal to
waive the dead man's statute and permit the plaintiff to testify.' The
court instructed the jury that no inference should be drawn from the re-
fusal although the defendant could have waived his statutory privilege.
On appeal the attorney's comment, although condemned as misconduct,
was held not to require reversal, especially since accompanied by an in-
struction-even though the instruction was not completely proper.
Thompson v. Hickman, 200 P. 2d 893 (Cal., 1st App. Dist. 1948).
Dead man's statutes give the defendant the privilege of refusing to
permit the plaintiff to testify in an action against a decedent's estate. It
was early held in Laird v. Laird 2 that comment on the defendant's re-
fusal was prejudicial. Since then, there has been an increasing tendency
either to permit comment on the exercise of various evidential privileges
or to consider it harmless, as exemplified by the statutes and cases of Cali-
fornia and other states. Civil 3 and some criminal cases 4 have permitted
comment on a defendant's refusal to testify on the grounds of self-incrimi-
nation. A series of California criminal cases have held that comment
upon a defendant's refusal to permit his wife to testify was not preju-
12. Brief for Appellee, p. 4.
13. U. S. ex rel. Fontan v. Uhl, 16 F. Supp. 428 (S. D. N. Y. 1936) ; KANSAS,
UNITED STATES ImmIGRATION, DEPORTATION AND CITIZENSHIP 180 (3d ed. 1948).
14. Neary v. Markham, 155 F. 2d 485 (10th Cir. 1946); Moore v. Rochester
Weaver Mining Co., 42 Nev. 164, 174 Pac. 1017 (1918); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACrS
§497 (1932).
1. CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 1880 (Deering, 1948). In Kinley v. Largent, 187
Cal. 71, 200 Pac. 937 (1921) it was held that an executor may waive the statutory
privilege.
2. 127 Mich. 24, 86 N. W. 436 (1901).
3. Morris v. McClellan, 154 Ala. 639, 45 So. 641 (1908); Foss v. Wotton, 3 Cal.
2d 384, 44 P. 2d 350 (1935).
4. State v. Graff, 228 Iowa 159, 290 N. W. 97 (1940); State v. Ferguson, 226
Iowa 361, 283 N. W. 917 (1939).
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dicial if there was any curative statement by the court.5 California has
gone so far as to change its constitution to permit either the court or the
prosecutor to comment upon the defendant's failure to testify in a criminal
case.6  The court in the instant case based its opinions on an analogy
to the above criminal cases, apparently concluding that if evidential privi-
leges may be restricted where personal liberty is involved, the same re-
sult follows a fortiori where only property rights are affected.
Comment upon the exercise of an evidential privilege impairs its
value, since the inferences drawn by the jury will usually be unfavorable
to the claimant; thus a decision on the advisability of allowing comment
depends on the validity of the privilege. At common law interested
parties were incompetent witnesses because their testimony was believed
to be untrustworthy. 7 While such disabilities have been largely removed
or modified, the dead man's statutes remain as a limited application of
the original rule. Proponents claim such statutes place the parties in
equality by denying to the plaintiff evidence unavailable to the defendant
and prevent the introduction of undependable yet irrefutable testimony."
On the other hand it is strongly argued that this rule unjustifiably puts
the need for excluding dishonest plaintiffs above the injustice done honest
plaintiffs by barring what may be the only direct evidence of the trans-
action; that an unscrupulous plaintiff may circumvent the rule by in-
troducing the testimony of perjured witnesses; and that cross-examination
will expose faulty testimony in this type of case as readily as in any
other.9 Dead man's statutes have been abolished or modified by most
common law countries, but only by a minority of American jurisdictions; 10
such statutes are much criticized by eminent authority." The American
Law Institute, in the Model Code of Evidence, retains several evidential
privileges but allows comment upon their exercise,' 2 possibly to reduce
indirectly the effectiveness of these privileges where direct repeal might
encounter legislative resistance. Although the instant case does not allow
comment, the decision reflects to some extent the tendency to sterilize
evidential privileges in order to encourage the introduction of all relevant
evidence.
5. E. g., People v. KIor, 197 P. 2d 705 (Cal. 1948) ; People v. Briggs, 20 Cal. 2d
42, 123 P. 2d 433 (1942). See instant case at 899.
6. CAL. CONST. Art. I, § 13 (1931). Adamson v. People of California, 332 U. S.
46 (1947), held that such provision did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
7. 2 WIGmoRE EVIDENCE §§ 575, 576 (3d ed. 1940).
8. See Harris v. Bank, 22 Fla. 501, 506, 507 (1886) ; Owens v. Owens, 14 W. Va.
88, 95 (1878).
9. See St. John v. Loftland, 5 N. D. 140, 143, 64 N. W. 930, 932 (1895). See
MORGAN ET AL., THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 23 (1927) ; 2 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 578 (3d
ed. 1940).
10. There are three primary modifications: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5608 (1930) ad-
mits the testimony of the surviving party and extant writings or declarations of the
deceased; N. H. Rav. LAws, c. 392, §§ 24, 27, 28 (1942) excludes the survivors' testi-
mony except when at the discretion of the trial court it appears injustice may be
done; ORE. ComP. LAws ANN. §3-103 (1940) permits the plaintiff to testify but
allows no recovery without corroboration of some sort. MAss. ANN. LAWS. c. 233,
§ 316 (Michie, 1933) abolishes the disqualification completely. Also see MODEL CODE
OF EVIDENCE, Rule 101 (1942).
11. MORGAN ET AL., THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 26 (1927); TAFT, LAW REFoRm 79
(1926) ; 2 WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 578 (3d ed. 1940).
12. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rules 201, 233 (1942).
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Husband and Wife-Desertion by Wife no Bar to Support Order
Where Husband Commences Adulterous Cohabitation Before Right
to Divorce has Accrued-In 1925 relatrix left her husband with-
out legal cause. Within fifteen months after her departure, he com-
menced to live in adultery with another woman in the former marital
home. Relatrix knew of this illicit relationship from about the time of
its inception but sought no reconciliation. In 1946, finding that she
could no longer support herself, relatrix sought a support order. The
lower court refused to grant support and dismissed the petition. On ap-
peal, this judgment was reversed, the court stating that a husband, dur-
ing the two years after his 'wife has left him, cannot by his conduct
prevent her return, but "must leave the door open" for her during this
time if he is to rely upon her desertion as a defense to an action for a
support order. Commonwealth ex rel. Cartmell v. Cartmell, 164 Pa.
Super. 108, 63 A. 2d 691 (1949).
Under § 733 of the Criminal Code of June 24, 1939,1 any husband
who "without reasonable cause . . . neglects to maintain his wife" is
liable for her support. The only such "reasonable cause" is conduct on
her part which would constitute a valid ground for divorce.2  However,
if a wife leaves her husband voluntarily and without legal cause, she will
thereby defeat her right to a support order; 3 and if she persists in such
an unjustified separation for a period of two years, the right to a divorce
will have accrued,4 relieving her husband forever of any legal obligation
to contribute to her support. The duty rests upon the deserting wife to
make a bona fide offer to resume marital relations within that period.5
The silence of the deserted husband will not be construed as consent to the
separation.6 However, he must be ready and willing to welcome her re-
turn during the entire period.7 If in that time he expresses his unwill-
ingness or reluctance to receive her, she is excused from the duty of
offering to return.8  The disposal of the marital home b the husband
is not considered such an act as will make her offer unnecessary.9 How-
ever, his filing a libel in divorce has been held to evince the required
unwillingness on his part; 10 as has his open celebration of a marriage to
another woman within the period.1 The law will not require a woman
to sacrifice honor and self respect to return to her husband while he is
1. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 4733 (Purdon, 1945).
2. See Commonwealth ex rel. Myerson v. Myerson, 160 Pa. Super. 432, 434, 51
A. 2d 350, 351 (1947) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Sincavage v. Sincavage, 153 Pa. Super.
457, 460, 34 A. 2d 266, 267 (1943) ; Commonwealth v. Henderson, 143 Pa. Super. 347,
350, 17 A. 2d 692, 693 (1940).
3. See Commonwealth ex rel. Pinkenson v. Pinkenson, 162 Pa. Super. 227, 229,
57 A. 2d 720, 721 (1948) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Myerson v. Myerson, 160 Pa. Super.
432, 434, 51 A. 2d 350, 351 (1947) ; Commonwealth v. Bachman, 108 Pa. Super. 422,
425, 164 Atl. 833, 834 (1933).
4. Salakas v. Salakas, 162 Pa. Super. 114, 56 A. 2d 357 (1948).
5. Lankin v. Lankin, 156 Pa. Super. 262, 40 A. 2d 357 (1948).
6. Westfall v. Westfall, 148 Pa. Super. 477, 25 A. 2d 614 (1942).
7. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 145 Pa. Super. 577, 20 A. 2d 832 (1941).
8. Ibid. See Trussell v. Trussell, 116 Pa. Super. 592, 598, 177 At. 215, 218
(1935).
9. See Helm v. Helm, 143 Pa. Super. 22, 25, 17 A. 2d 758, 759 (1940).
10. See Latour v. Latour, 162 Pa. Super. 75, 77, 56 A. 2d 332, 333 (1948).
11. Eichert v. Eichert, 3 Weekly Notes of Cases 290 (Pa. C. P. 1876). See Hall
v. Hall, 86 Mass. 39, 41 (1862).
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living with his paramour; 12 and it is indicated in some jurisdictions that
his single act of adultery is enough to justify her continued absence.13
Though existing law seems to have warranted the holding in the
instant case, the law should perhaps be somewhat qualified. Clearly,
abandonment confers no license on the deserted party to offend against
the marriage vows; 14 but it must be remembered that the husband here
was neither the sole nor original offender. The objective of the two year
desertion period is to provide the maximum reasonable opportunity for
restoration of the marital relationship. To be entirely consistent with
this policy would be to require that the deserting wife must prove that
she actually was dissuaded by the expressed reluctance of her husband
from making an intended offer to return. Such requirement is not im-
posed presumably because of the difficulty of proof; also, in most cases
where the reluctance is expressed verbally, this requirement will have
been met, since the occasion will usually arise because the wife is at-
tempting to effect a reconciliation. However, if acts are to be accepted
as relieving the wife of her duty, the law should require, at least, clear
proof that she had knowledge of their commission 15 coupled with the ab-
sence of any evidence that she intended to remain away from her husband
regardless of his transgression. Although a twenty year delay to enforce
her rights might ordinarily cast doubt upon a wife's good faith, the court
in the instant case stated that the relatrix had satisfactorily explained her
failure to bring an action earlier. In view of this, the facts of the case
indicate that the result would have been the same had the rule been ap-
plied with the suggested restrictions.
Income Tax-Annual Payments Under Royalty Contract
Acquired on Liquidation Held Capital Gain Rather Than Ordinary
Income-Taxpayer was sole stockholder in a corporation which held
a patent royalty contract, payments under which were taxed as ordinary
income. On liquidation the contract was assigned to him; but because
its fair market value was not ascertainable, no capital gains tax was paid
thereon, although money received in addition to the contract on liquida-
tion exceeded the adjusted basis of his stock,' and capital gains tax was
paid on such excess. Taxpayer under protest paid taxes on subsequent
royalty receipts as ordinary income. The circuit court affirmed judg-
ment of refund by the district court, holding that because no fair market
value was ascertainable, the liquidation was not a closed transaction, and
therefore, subsequent receipts under the contract were deferred payments
taxable only as capital gain. Westover v. Smith, 5 P-H 1949 FED. TAx
SERv. f 72, 359 (9th Cir. Feb. 21, 1949). A factually similar case reached
the same result where the contract assigned was for brokerage commissions
having no ascertainable fair market value on liquidation. Commissioner
v. Carter, 170 F. 2d 911 (2d Cir. 1948).
12. Starr v. Starr, 134 Pa. Super. 497, 4 A. 2d 201 (1938) ; Evans v. Evans, 87
Pa. Super. 581 (1926). See Betzko v. Betzko, 81 Pa. Super. 231 (1923).
13. Dupont v. Dupont, 10 Iowa 112 (1859); Walker v. Walker, 172 Mass. 82,
51 N. E. 455 (1898). See Clapp v. Clapp, 97 Mass. 531, 533 (1867).
14. See Mattison v. Mattison, 60 Misc. 573, 575, 113 N. Y. Supp. 1024, 1026 (Sup.
Ct. 1908).
15. This requirement seems recognized in Cergueria v. Cergueria, 29 Northamp-
ton 288 (Pa. C. P. 1943).
1. INT. REv. CoDE § 113(a). "The basis of property shall be the cost of such
property . . ." (with certain adjustments and exceptions not relevant here).
14]RECENT CASES
The Internal Revenue Code provides that amounts received in
liquidation shall be treated as capital gains to the extent that any money
paid plus the fair market value of any other property received exceeds
the adjusted basis of the distributee's stock.2 "Property" includes the
right to future income.3 Although fair market value is a question of
fact,4 it has been held that while it may be determinable for some pur-
poses, it may be unascertainable for others.5  In Burnet v. Logan " it
was held that where fair market value, because of business contin-
gencies, is not ascertainable, the transaction is to be treated as continu-
ing open for tax purposes and subsequent receipts are installment pay-
ments not taxable as income until the adjusted basis of the stock has
been extinguished. Since the Code provides that distributions in "liqui-
dation of a corporation shall be treated as in full payment in exchange
for the stock," ' the instant cases reach a logical result. However, by
coupling the Burnet v. Logan doctrine to the transfer of the right to
future income, the curious result is to render payments which would have
been ordinary income to the corporation 8 taxable as capital gains as
they accrue to the distributee.0 But where the fair market value is as-
certainable, the transaction is closed and the full capital gains tax is paid
at once.1
The more favorable treatment accorded by the capital gains pro-
visions " represents, inter alia, an attempt to relieve the taxpayer from
a higher bracket when he realizes in a single tax period income which ac-
cumulated or will accumulate over a number of tax periods.12 Where
"property" is the right to future income, fair market value generally is
capitalization of the expected payments. Thus capitalized, it would seem
that the right to future income may be taxed as a capital gain consistently
2. INT. REv. CODE §§ 115(c), ll(a), 111(b).
3. E. g., Boudreau v. Commissioner, 134 F. 2d 360 (5th Cir. 1943) (future pay-
ments from sale of oil rights) ; Commissioner v. Hopkinson, 126 F. 2d 406 (2d Cir.
1942) (future payments from sale of patent rights).
4. E. 9., Maxfield v. United States, 152 F. 2d 593 (9th Cir. 1945), cert denied
327 U. S. 794; Boudreau v. Commissioner, supra note 3; U. S. Treas. Reg. 111,
§ 29.111-1 (1934). It is rare that no fair market value is ascertainable. Fleming v.
Commissioner, 153 F. 2d 361 (5th Cir. 1946) (fair market value of oil and mineral
rights based on estimates as to quantity present) ; Boudreau v. Commissioner, supra
note 3 (payments contingent on oil production had an upper limit); Commissioner
v. Swenson, 56 F. 2d 544 (5th Cir. 1932) (fair market value of leases based on mar-
ket value of stock for which exchanged).
5. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U. S. 404 (1931). There it was said that fair market
value for estate tax did not require the certainty needed for determining capital gains
tax.
6. 283 U. S. 404 (1931). In that case the "property" was the obligations of the
transferor to make contingent payments for stock sold by transferee.
7. NT. REv. CoDE § 115 (c).
8. In the Westover case payments to the corporation before liquidation were treated
as ordinary income. Instant case at 1f 72,420. In the Carter case commission payments
to the corporation before liquidation were ordinary income. See Susan J. Carter, 9
T. C. 364 (1947).
9. This is particularly startling when the distributee is the sole stockholder.
10. It is conceded that by relating back the future payments to the transaction,
annual readjustments could ultimately achieve the same result; but there is no in-
ference that such technique is to be followed. It would seem also, that taxpayer
should be liable for interest on his deferred taxes.
11. Under such provisions the maximum tax rate is 25%; as to ordinary income
the maximum rate is 77%.
12. See, Lowndes, The Taxation of Capital Gains and Losses Under the Federal
Income Tax, 26 TEx. L. REv. 440 (1948). See also, articles cited in Griswold, CASES
oN FEDERAL TAXATioN 526 (2d ed. 1946).
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with the above mentioned purpose.'3 Where the fair market value of
contingent income is not ascertainable, no doubt certainty is achieved
under the Burnet v. Logan doctrine, but the result is inconsistent with
the policy of the capital gains tax provisions. If certainty requires the
tax exactment to be deferred until payments are received by the tax-
payer, there is little justification for according the more favorable tax
treatment.' 4 The mere transfer of right to future income should not
make taxable as capital gains that which would have been ordinary in-
come to the transferor.' 5 To avoid such a result the Code might well
be amended to provide in this situation that the adjusted basis of the
property to the transferor be treated as the fair market value.'6 By
elimination of the area in which no fair market-value is ascertainable at
the time of the transaction, capital gains tax would be payable, if at all,
on the transfer, and subsequent receipts would be ordinary income to
the extent that they exceeded the adjusted basis apportioned to the tax
period in which received.
Income Tax-Patronage Refunds Held not Excludable From
Gross Income of Cooperative-The taxpayer, a corporation of Wis-
consin claiming to operate as a cooperative association, excluded from
its gross income in 1943 a sum designated "Patrons' Equity Reserve",
set up under the following resolution: ". . . that all the remaining net
income for said fiscal year is hereby distributed among the patrons of
this association . . . in the form of a patrons' equity reserve, in propor-
tion to the monetary value of the dairy products delivered to the associa-
tion during said fiscal year." Certificates were issued to patrons against
this reserve, and provided that if "in the opinion of the Board of Directors
of said Association the cash reserves are greater than are reasonably
necessary for the sound financing of the Association," such excess cash
may be used to pay off the "conditional equitable interests" in the re-
serve. If' the association operated at a loss, the directors might apply
the entire reserve to meet that loss. The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue declared a deficiency in the tax due. The Court of Appeals for
13. However, as to particular types of future income, other considerations may
dictate a different treatment. See, e. g., Brown v. Helvering, 291 U. S. 193 (1934) ;
North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U. S. 417 (1932). Payments under
patent licenses or royalty contracts may be ordinary income or only capital gain de-
pending on the circumstances. See Geller and Levitan, A Study of Tax Problems Re-
lating to Patents, 25 TAXES 313 (1947).
14. In the Carter case, the court cites Commissioner v. Hopkinson, supra note 3,
as holding that after the basis has been extinguished, subsequent payments are capital
gain. However, that case involved installment payments from a sale which had been
taxable to the transferor only as capital gain. Their tax status did not change on the
transfer.
15. The donee of installment payments is to be taxed as would donor had there
been no transfer. Commissioner v. Hopkinson, supra note 3 (patent royalties not
ordinary income to donee because they would have been only capital gain to the
donor). There appears to be no particular policy to encourage liquidation of corpora-
tions which receive ordinary income from contracts having no ascertainable fair mar-
ket value. See note 13 supra.
16. To assign a zero basis and treat subsequent payments as ordinary income is
unfair to the stockholder since a loss on the transaction could be carried forward only
to a limited extent. See INT. REv. CoDE §§ 117(d), 117(e).
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the Seventh Circuit, affirming the decision of the Tax Court,1 held that
the Patrons' Equity Reserve was not excludable from the association's
gross income as a patronage refund. Fountain City Cooperative Creamery
Ass'n v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 172 F. 2d 666 (7th Cir.
1949).
The typical cooperative distributes the difference between its gross
receipts and cost of operation, less certain items such as educational
funds and depreciation reserves, to its patrons in the form of patronage
refunds,2 based on the value of the goods delivered to or bought from
the cooperative by each patron. The income of certain types of coopera-
tives is specifically exempt from federal income tax, 3 but even where, as
here, the cooperative does not qualify for this exemption, 4 the patronage
refunds made by it may still be excluded from gross income under cer-
tain circumstances. It has been the long-standing position of the Treas-
ury Department that patronage refunds be excluded on the theory that
they in reality represent a reduction in cost to the patron of goods pur-
chased by him through the cooperative, or an additional compensation due
him for goods sold through the cooperative. 5 The basic question in de-
ciding whether the refund may be excluded from gross income is whether
or not the association is under a legal obligation, existing prior to the
earning of the income,6 to refund some part of it to its patrons. If such
an obligation is found to exist, the income is not taxable to the associa-
tion, on the theory that the money belongs not to the association, but
to its patrons.7  The crucial point, then, will be the interpretation of the
provision purporting to create such an obligation. The indication is that
the provision must unequivocally designate such income the property of
the patrons as it is received by the association. A "mere understanding"
that the income will be so refunded is insufficient.8 Similarly, if any act
is required on the part of the management of the association to "solidify"
the patrons' right to receive the refund, no deduction will be allowed.9
The Wisconsin statute 10 applicable to the association in the instant
case provided that the directors "shall apportion" the net proceeds of the
business annually; and this statute had been construed by the highest
court of that state to mean that what part, if any, of the proceeds, once
1. 9 TC 1077 (1947).
2. Also called patronage dividends or patronage rebates.
3. IxT. REv. CODE § 101 (12) exempts, generally, farmers' buying and selling co-
operatives provided certain features of organization and conduct are observed.
4. The taxpayer did not claim exemption from tax under § 101(12), supra note 3.
5. I. T. 3208, 2 Cum. BULL. 127 (1938). This position has found approval in de-
cisions of the Board of Tax Appeals and the Tax Court, but apparently has never
reached the Supreme Court. United Cooperatives, Inc. v. Commissioner, 4 TC 93
(1944); see Midland Cooperative Wholesale Co. v. Commissioner, 44 B. T. A. 824,
830 (1941).
6. Peoples Gin Co. v. Commissioner, 41 B. T. A. 343 (1940), aff'd, 156 F. 2d 629
(9th Cir. 1946). Where obligation to pay patronage refund was incurred after earn-
ing of the income, no deduction was allowed. The association subsequently amended
its by-laws in such a way as to make obligatory the payment of patronage refund out
of future earnings, and the deduction of these refunds was allowed. Peoples Gin Co.
v. Commissioner, P-H 1943 TC MEm. DEc. SE-v. 43,304 (1943).
7. Cases cited note 5 supra.
8. American Box Shook Export Ass'n v. Commissioner, 4 TC 758 (1945);
accord, Druggists Supply Corp. v. Commissioner, 8 TC 1343 (1947).
9. See Midland Cooperative Wholesale Co. v. Commissioner, 44 B. T. A. 824, 832
(1941).
10. Wis. STAT., c. 185.16(1) (1943).
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they were apportioned, should go to the patrons, rested in the discretion
of the board of directors or a majority of the stockholders." Thus the
statute gave the patrons no absolute legal right to any refund. More-
over, the certificates issued against the reserve fund contained equivocal
language, namely that the holder had only a "conditional equitable in-
terest" in the reserve. Further, it will be noted that by the language of
these certificates, the directors had very wide discretion in determining
whether or not any refund would ever be made.12  For these reasons,
the circuit court apparently felt that the association was under no obli-
gation to distribute the equity reserve to its patrons, and that therefore
the fund was at all times the property of the association and not of its
patrons. In view of the fact that the deduction of patronage refunds
from gross income of this kind of association appears to be entirely a
matter of generosity ooi the part of the Treasury Department,13 it would
seem that this decision merely reflects a reluctance to extend that
generosity to a situation of this kind, where the right of the patrons to
the refund is at best inchoate. It would be a comparatively simple thing
for the association here to rephrase the provisions governing the equity
reserve along the lines of those approved in prior decisions, 14 and thus
receive the benefit of the deduction without losing its power to main-
tain a reasonable reserve for contingencies.
Labor Law-FLSA-Regularly Paid Bonuses Constitute Part of
an Employee's "Regular Rate" for Purposes of Computing Overtime-
The Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division sought to enjoin a
violation of § 7 (a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act ' which requires
that all overtime work be compensated at one and one-half times the
employees' "regular rate". At approximately three month intervals for
six years defendant corporation voted employees a share of profits. Not
only did the amount of distribution vary at the defendant's discretion,
but the particular vote constituted the only authorization or promise that
a bonus would be granted for that period. The Circuit Court, neverthe-
less, held the bonuses to be part of the "regular rate" and enjoined the
violation of § 7 (a), arising from defendant's failure to compute overtime
on these distributions as well as on the basic wage rate. McComb v.
Shepard Niles Crane & Hoist Corp., 171 F. 2d 69 (2d Cir. 1948).
11. Pearson v. Clam Falls Cooperative Dairy Ass'n, 243 Wis. 369, 374, 10 N. W.
2d 132, 134 (1943).
12. See the provisions of the certificates, set out in the first paragraph of the text.
13. Midland Cooperative Wholesale Co. v. Commissioner, 44 B. T. A. 824, 830
(1941). "The Treasury Department, however . . . with 'great liberality' has
allowed such deductions 'to the end that substantial justice may be done to an associa-
tion which is engaged in cooperative marketing or purchasing work but which may
not be exempt from taxation'." The theory of allowing such a deduction seems to be
in conflict with the doctrine that assigned income is nevertheless 'taxable to the as-
signor, though he may never receive it beneficially. See the leading case of Lucas v.
Earl, 281 U. S. 111 (1930).
14. See, e. g., the phraseology of the provisions in United Cooperatives, Inc. v.
Commissioner, supra note 5, where the deduction was allowed where the management
had power to set up reserves for depreciation and other contingencies, and for pay-
ment of dividends.
1. 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29 U. S. C. §201 et seq. (1946).
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Profit-sharing bonuses,2 paid at the employer's discretion, have been
declared, for most purposes, gratuities rather than wages, since they are
independent of services rendered aid unenforceable by the employees
as a contractual right.3 There is no indication in the legislative history
of the FLSA of an intent to include bonus payments within the terms
of § 7 (a).4 Nevertheless, where periodic disbursements out of profits
have been made under an established plan, they have been held to consti-
tute part of the employees' regular rate, even though the plan was
revocable at the company's will.5 The rationale is that employees, in
reliance on such a plan, are less likely to change jobs or seek wage in-
creases; consequently, the employer receives the benefits inherent in a
higher wage and therefore should have the correlative obligation of in-
creased overtime expenditures. The instant case extends this reason-
ing to a situation where there is no definitive plan, but only a series of
periodic payments. The bonuses were in fact paid at regular intervals;
consequently, the court refused to recognize a distinction based on the
absence of a promulgated arrangement, stating that the employees' reli-
ance would be the same whether induced by a fixed plan or by regularity.6
If this decision renders regularity of payments the sole criterion of
the "regular rate," § 7 (a) is given unnecessarily broad scope. For ex-
ample, under this test an annual Christmas gift would be subject to the
requirement of time and a half. The result is to deter such bonuses
without implementing the purpose of the overtime section.7 Furthermore,
the decision apparently subjects the beneficent employer to suits for ad-
ditional overtime compensation and the liquidated double damages award-
able under the Act." On the other hand, this decision forces compliance
with the mandate of § 7 (a), since it precludes an employer from sup-
plementing a sub-par wage with liberal bonuses, so as to retain his em-
ployees, yet minimize overtime expenditures. The desirable result would
be one condemning the latter activity without extending the section to
encompass the gratuities first mentioned. A bonus can effect an evasion
of § 7 (a) only if it induces employees to rely on it as their regular pay
rather than demand a wage raise, on which the employer would have
to pay overtime. Applying the Act to such a bonus will force proper
overtime payments, since, under the premise that employees look upon
2. Incentive bonuses--4. e., premiums paid for any pieces produced in excess of a
quota-are generally conceded to be part of the regular rate of compensation. Walling
v. Harnischfeger Corp., 325 U. S. 427 (1945) ; Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hard-
wood Co., 325 U. S. 419 (1945).
3. Walling v. Frank Adam Electric Co., 163 F. 2d 277 (8th Cir. 1947) ; Black v.
Roland Electrical Co., 68 F. Supp. 117 (D. Md. 1946), rev'd on other grounds, 163
F. 2d 417 (4th Cir. 1947) ; Winer v. Eckerling, 323 Ill. App. 421, 55 N. E. 2d 876 (1st
Dist. 1944); Bonus Payments, Wage and Hour Div. Press Release No. A-13, Feb.
5, 1945.
4. See 87 CoNG. REc. 6040 (1941).
5. Walling v. Garlock Packing Co., 159 F. 2d 44 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
331 U. S. 820 (1947) ; cf. Walling v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 154 F. 2d 780 (2d
Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 328 U. S. 870 (1946).
6. Compare the adoption of regularity as a criterion of wages in Nineteen Hun-
dred Corp., 12 War Labor 417 (1943).
7. The overtime provisions were designed to encourage wider distribution of em-
ployment. Overnight Motor Transport Co. v. Missel, 316 U. S. 572 (1942); Carle-
ton Screw Plumbing Co. v. Fleming, 126 F. 2d 537 (8th Cir. 1942).
8. 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29 U. S. C. §216(b) (1946). However,
the breadth of the sanction has been reduced by a two year Statute of Limitations
and stringent restrictions on the double damage clause. 61 STAT. 87, 89 (1947), 29
U. S. C. §§ 255, 260 (Supp. 1948).
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the bonus as part of their wages, any attempt to cease payment will be
resisted with demands that higher pay be substituted. Conversely, if
the bonus is such as to be regarded as simply a gift, it could be elimi-
nated without difficulty. Reliance, therefore, rather than regularity is
determinative, although regularity may be an important factor in de-
ciding whether the bonus plan might invoke reliance. Despite the em-
phasis placed on regularity by the opinion in the instant case, the recog-
nition given reliance indicates that the basis for the decision was in reality
that the bonus, in the light of all the circumstances, might reasonably
persuade the employees to accept a lower base pay. Such a test fully
effectuates the purpose of the section.
Sales-Patron of Self-service Market, Injured by Exploding
Bottle, Denied Recovery Against Manufacturer on Implied Warranty
-While plaintiff was shopping with his wife in a self-service market, he.
picked up a bottle of carbonated beverage which exploded injuring his
wife. In an action against the manufacturer for breach of implied war-
ranty of fitness for purpose,' a judgment for the defendant on the plead-
ings was affirmed on the ground that there could be no warranty in the
plaintiff's favor since no sale had been consummated. Loch v. Confair,
361 Pa. 158, 63 A. 2d 24 (1949).
Normally the existence of a warranty has been considered depend-
ent upon the existence of contractual relations between plaintiff and
defendant. 2 Thus, if recovery is to be had on warranty, the action must
ordinarily be brought by a buyer against his immediate seller. Actions
against remote suppliers have usually been based on negligence which in-
volves a more difficult and expensive procedure, unless the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur is available.3 But a tendency has developed to use war-
ranty liability as a means of driving the cost of injury resulting from
unexplained defects in goods back to the manufacturers.4  In this way,
even in the absence of fault, the cost of injury is more readily made a
part of the cost of production to be shared by all consumers. Therefore,
in a few instances, particularly cases involving foods and beverages, the
requirement of privity of contract for warranty has been relaxed.5 Re-
covery under a warranty theory has been successful despite lack of privity
in two different factual contexts. Where actions have been brought
against remote suppliers, recoveries have been rationalized by analogies
1. UNIFoRM SALES AcT § 15 (1); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 124 (Purdon,
1931).
2. UNIFORM SALES AcT §§ 13, 14, 15, 16 all contain language indicating the neces-
sity of a contract or of a sale for an implied warranty. See also UNIFORM SALES Acr
ANN. 106 (1931).
3. In the instant case the court also ruled that since the action was in assumpsit
there could be no recovery even though a negligence theory might have supported it.
Instant case at 162, 63 A. 2d at 26. Perhaps one explanation of why the plaintiff did
not bring his action in tort and rely on res ipsa loquitur was the assumption that it
did not apply in Pennsylvania to exploding bottle cases. See Sweeney v. Blue Anchor
Beverage Co., 325 Pa. 216, 220, 189 Atl. 331, 334 (1937) ; Coralnick v. Abbotts Dai-
ries, 337 Pa. 344, 345, 11 A. 2d 143, 144 (1940). However, since the date of the de-
cision in the instant case, a new decision would seem to indicate that res ipsa does
apply to exploding bottle cases. Dillon v. Scull, 64 A. 2d 525 (Pa. Super. 1949).
4. See PROssER, TORTS 688 (1941).
5. PRoSszR, ToRTs 690 (1941); Spruill, Privity of Contract as a Requisite for
Recovery on Warranty, 19 N. C. L. Irnv. 551, 561 (1941). For a detailed discussion
of the rationalizations therefor, see Jeanblanc, Manufacturers! Liability, 24 VA. L.
Rav. 134, 146 (1937).
RECENT CASES
to covenants running with the land,6 to third party beneficiary con-
tracts, 7 or have been accepted substantially without rationalization on
principles of public policy.8 Somewhat more difficult to rationalize have
been the cases where tlhe action is brought by donees or members of a
family injured by the defective goods purchased by their donor or another
member of the family. Here, the absence of any contractual relationship
on the part of the plaintiff has been too great a conceptual barrier for
many courts.9 Nevertheless, agency -0 and occasionally third party bene-
ficiary ". or covenant ' 2 rationale have been carried over and successfully
employed.
The problem of contractual liability for injury growing out of defec-
tive goods in a self-service market before they have been paid for has
been faced only once. In Lasky v. Economy Stores 13 the action was
brought against the immediate vendor. There it was held that since there
was no contractual relationship between plaintiff and defendant no war-
ranty could exist. Although the Lasky case has been severely criticized,' 4
the court in the instant case found its logic too appealing to avoid reach-
ing the same result.'; However, a distinction between the two cases
appears to have been overlooked. In the instant case, the action was
brought against the remote supplier rather than the immediate vendor.
A valid contract of sale presumably did take place between the manufac-
turer and the retailer carrying with it an implied warranty that the product
was fit for the purpose for which it was intended, i. e., display and sale
as a beverage. It does not appear to be a very great step to adopt the
third party beneficiary rationale by allowing a potential customer to avail
himself of the warranty arising out of this contract on the theory that
the retailer in "extracting the warranty" intended it to run to his potential
customers, especially since it is to the advantage of the retailer to retain
safe and attractive displays. If such a rationale were adopted the presence
or absence of a sale between retailer and plaintiff would become imma-
terial. In view of the wide-spread use of self-service stores as a method
of retail distribution, such an extension of warranty law seems highly
desirable.
Taxation-State May Tax Vessels of Foreign Corporation Oper-
ating in Interstate Commerce-Three corporations were engaged in
commerce on the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers. Only one of them oper-
ated vessels within the state of incorporation, although none maintained
any vessels permanently in Louisiana. The City of New Orleans and
Louisiana levied ad valorem taxes I under assessments based on the pro-
6. Nock v. Coca Cola, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 Atl. 537 (1931).
7. Ward Baking Co. v. Trizinno, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N. E. 557 (8th Dist.
1928).
8. Hertzler v. Manshum, 228 Mich. 416, 200 N. W. 155 (1924) ; Catani v. Swift,
251 Pa. 52, 54, 95 Atl. 931, 932 (1915).
9. Hanback v. Dutch Baker Boy, 107 F. 2d 203 (D. C. Cir. 1939); Colonna v.
Rosedale Dairy Co., 166 Va. 314, 186 S. E. 94 (1936).
10. Gimenez v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 264 N. Y. 390, 191 N. E. 27
(1934) ; Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N. Y. 388, 175 N. E. 165 (1931).
11. Singer v. Zabalin, 24 N. Y. S. 2d 962 (City Ct. N. Y. 1941).
12. Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 11 So. 305 (1927).
13. 319 Mass. 224, 65 N. E. 2d 305 (1947).
14. See 47 COL. L. REv. 156 (1947) suggesting analogies to restaurant and bail-
ment cases to extend warranty liability.
15. Instant case at 165, 63 A. 2d at 27.
1. 6 LA. GEN. STAT. § 8370 (Dart, 1913).
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portion which each company's lines in Louisiana bore to its entire system.
Having paid under protest, the corporations instituted suits for reimburse-
ment contending that the taxes violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause. The Court of Ap-
peals held that such tax violated the Due Process Clause because the
taxed vessels had acquired no "actual situs" in Louisiana. On appeal the
decision was reversed. Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 17 U.
S. L. Week 4183 (U. S. February 7, 1949).
The general rule as to the taxation of vessels plying between the
ports of different states in interstate commerce is that the domicile of the
owner is the taxable situs of the vessels, subject to the exception that
where they have acquired an "actual situs" in another state they may
be taxed entirely in that state. 2 Vessels have been said to have acquired
an "actual situs" in a non-domicilary state when they have been per-
manently within the state for the whole tax year.3 The fact that vessels
visit non-domiciliary ports to carry on business does not confer juris-
diction to tax such vessels to their full value. While in the instant case
none of the vessels were permanently within the State of Louisiana, the
court held that a portion of the entire fleet had acquired a tax situs there,
applying the rule heretofore used in taxing vehicles in interstate land
transportation.4  This rule permits a non-domiciliary state to fix a tax
by an appraisement of the average amount of property used in the state.
Louisiana, thus, does not tax any particular vessel to the extent of its
entire value, but a portion of each fleet. The case was one of first
impression in this field, and the Supreme Court held the tax violated
neither the Commerce Clause-since interstate commerce can be made to
pay its share of the tax burden which each state may impose on property
within its borders-nor the Due Process Clause-since the vessels re-
ceived benefits from the taxing state.
Since the tax formula approved in the instant case precludes the
danger of burdensome multiple taxation by non-domiciliary states, and
since Louisiana supplied harbor facilities and police and fire protection, 5
there seems little basis for disagreement with the reasoning adopted by
the Court. However, the decision raises a problem the solution of which
may present future difficulty; multiple taxation will result if the domi-
ciliary state may tax the whole fleet. The Court states in its opinion
that there is no risk of multiple taxation, yet, in the recent Northwest
Airlines case the right of the domiciliary state to tax all the property in
interstate commerce was upheld although the airplanes made regular stops
in non-domiciliary states and had been taxed there in previous years.'
2. Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 292 U. S. 409 (1906) ; St. Louis v. Ferry
Co., 11 Wall. 423, 430 (U. S. 1870).
3. Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. S. 299 (1905). See Ayer & Lord
Co. v. Kentucky, supra note 2, at 423.
4. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18 (1891). Here Penn-
sylvania taxed that proportion of the company's capital stock which the miles of rails
in the state bore to the company's total rail mileage. Cf. Johnson Oil Refining Co.
v. Oklahoma, 290 U. S. 158 (1933), where the proportion was arrived at by taking
the daily average number of railroad cars physically present within the taxing state.
5. Union Refrigerator Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905). But cf. Southern
Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63 (1911), holding that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not require, as a condition to the exercise of the power to tax, that the
domiciliary state confer benefit.
6. Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292 (1944). Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, writing for the majority, said that the taxability of any part of the fleet of
airplanes by a non-domiciliary state was not in issue and refused to commit the court
on the point.
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The Supreme Court in that case held that the only judicial restriction on
the domiciliary state is invoked when the property is permanently situated
in another state for the tax year. Applying this restriction to the rule
in the instant case, it is clear that at least one of the corporations is sub-
ject to multiple taxation since the domicile may tax the same portion
of the fleet that is taxed in Louisiana. To avoid multiple taxation in this
field the Court can restrict its holding in the Northwest Airlines case to
air commerce, and limit the tax rights of the domicile to a proportion
measured by the same formula as determines the rights of non-domiciliary
states.7 Although it may be desirable to avoid multiple taxation, the Su-
preme Court is in disagreement as to whether there are any Constitu-
tional sanctions against it.8
Trade Regulation-Contracting to Sell at a Discriminatory Price
Does not Violate § 2 (a) of the Clayton Act-The plaintiff agreed to
purchase lacquer at $1.85 per gallon from the defendant, a manufacturer,
providing the former was awarded a contract to supply lacquer to the
State of New Hampshire. The defendant thereupon offered to sell to
the state at $1.75 per gallon, substantially underbidding the plaintiff, and
secured the contract. This action was brought to recover treble dam-
ages I for injuries resulting from price discrimination in violation of § 2
(a) of the Clayton Act.2 The court granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss, holding that since § 2 (a) forbids price discrimination between
"purchasers", it applies only where there have been two sales.8 A. .
Goodman & Sons, Inc. v. United Lacquer Manufacturing Co., 81 F. Supp.
890 (D. Mass. 1949).
The precise point in issue has not previously been met by the courts.
The Act, as amended, prohibits direct or indirect "discrimination in
price between different purchasers." 4 There have been several de-
cisions, relied on in the instant case, which have denied recovery where
the defendant merely refused to sell to the plaintiff, stating broadly that
two sales are required to effect an illegal price discrimination; 5 thus
"mere shopping" by the seller does not constitute discrimination between
7. See Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. Oklahoma, supra note 4, at 162. North-
west Airlines v. Minnesota, supra note 6, at 314 (dissenting opinion).
8. See Mr. Justice Black, concurring in Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, supra
note 6, at 301. Intangible property may be subject to multiple taxation without con-
stitutional violation. See 56 YALE L. J. 645 (1947).
1. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 15 (1946).
2. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13(a) (1946).
3. The court also held that the plaintiff could show no injury. The cases arising
under the Anti-Trust Laws have been liberal in finding injury sufficient for civil relief.
E. g., Frey & Sons, Inc. v. Welch Grape Juice Co., 240 Fed. 114 (4th Cir. 1917) ;
Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. National Electric Products Corp., 152 F. 2d 398 (3rd
Cir. 1945). See Donovan and Irvine, Proof of Damages Under the Anti-Trust Law,
88 U. or PA. L. REv. 511 (1940). If the plaintiff is a contractor who transacts all
his business through the medium of bids, he could be effectively priced out of the
field without an opportunity t6 avail himself of the statutory sanctions. Since the
private enforcement provisions of the Anti-Trust Laws are punitive as well as reme-
dial, a liberal definition of injury is desirable. The holding of the instant case seems
justified only by the fact that the plaintiff's bid was the third lowest. This is not
mentioned in the opinion of the court.
4. See note 2 supra.
5. See Shaws', Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 105 F. 2d 331, 333 (3rd Cir. 1939) ; Sor-
rentino v. Glen-Gery Shale Brick Co., 46 F. Supp. 709, 712 (E. D. Pa. 1942).
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purchasers. These cases do not appear conclusive precedent. They have
been criticized, particularly if the refusal affected a buyer-seller relation-
ship of long standing.6 Refusal to sell is a necessary incident to the
right of an individual to select his own customers. The conduct of the
defendant here cannot be so explained; the instant case, therefore, by
prohibiting a discriminatory contract to sell, goes further than the de-
cisions which first voiced the rule. Moreover, it may be inferred from
the terms of § 2 (a) that even a refusal to sell is illegal discrimination
if designed to restrain trade.7 Clearly the Act is not directed at price
discrimination in itself, but at preventing the lessening of competition that
results if the discrimination forces the victim from the field; 8 the im-
portant consideration, therefore, is not whether the transaction can be
said to involve two "purchasers", but what its effect may be. A con-
tract to sell which tends to produce this result as effectively as a consum-
mated sale should be considered an unlawful price discrimination.9
Had the instant case gone to trial, it might well have been found
that the effect of the discrimination was not to "substantially lessen compe-
tition." The entry of the manufacturer into the retail field increases
competition; it is not the price discrimination which here threatens the
retailer, but the greater efficiency of his new competitor. On the other
hand, if the eventual result is the destruction of the middleman in favor
of a large vertical organization, there may be justification for the inclusion
of this activity within the prohibitions of § 2 (a). It may be argued, how-
ever, that basic anti-trust policy contemplates the broadest freedom of
individual economic choice commensurate with the economic freedom of
all; 10 hence this transaction should not be condemned unless there be
a showing of imminent detriment to the competitive market. The elimi-
nation, by competition, of an incompetent competitor has not hitherto
been considered a violation of the anti-trust laws." However, although
the facts involved may have warranted the decision reached in the instant
case,12 the rule upon which it was based bears no relation to the policy of
the Act.
6. See 40 COL. L. REv. 157 (1940); 11 GEo. WAsHa. L. REv. 122 (1942).
7. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13(a) (1946). See also 80 CONG. REC.
6333 (1936). This section specifically excludes from the operation of the statute
bona fide selection of customers in transactions not in restraint of trade. By negative
implication a refusal to sell which is in restraint of trade is prohibited by the Act.
It is clear that a refusal to sell may violate the Anti-Trust Laws if part of a monopo-
listic scheme. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U. S. 600
(1927) ; Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Association v. United States, 234 U. S.
600, 614 (1914).
8. Hamilton and Loevinger, The Second Attack on Price Discrimination: "'he
Robinson-Patman Act, 22 WASH. U. L. Q. 153, 157 (1937).
9. The Act forbids discrimination by contract in other situations. See 49 STAT.
1528 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13(a) (1936) ; 49 STAT. 1527 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13(c-e)
(1946).
10. See American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377 (1921).
11. If the manufacturer undertook to sell to consumers at the same price as to
the retailer, this would preclude the plaintiff as effectively as a price which favored
the consumer, as did the bid in the instant case, yet it would be difficult to find price
discrimination. If such activity were held to be prohibited by § 2(a), there results
a rule that failure to give retailers (and, presumably, wholesalers) a discount is illegal
price discrimination. This conclusion reads the Clayton Act to forbid manufacturers
to compete at the distribution levels.
12. An alternative ground for the decision appears in the proposition that a sale
to a governmental body is not within the purview of the statute. See General Shale
Products Corp. v. Struck Constr. Co., 37 F. Supp. 598 (W. D. Ky. 1941); 38 Ops.
ATr'y GEr. 539 (1936).
